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I.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal of an order denying a motion to compel arbitration. R. 85.
Therefore, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0') (Supp. 2002) (Supreme Court has jurisdiction over "orders,
judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals does not
have original appellate jurisdiction").
II.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue presented is whether the trial court erred in refusing to compel
arbitration, despite the existence of a written arbitration agreement executed on April 3,
2001, and contrary to the provisions of the Utah Arbitration Act, Utah Code Ann. § 7831a-4 (repealed effective May 15, 2003), mandating that "[tjhe court, upon motion of any
party showing the existence of an arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to
arbitrate." R. 9-31; 85-87.
The standard of review is one of correctness, giving no deference to the legal
conclusions of the trial court. This Court has held, "As a general rule, whether a trial
court correctly decided a motion to compel arbitration is a question of law which we
review for correctness, according no deference to the trial judge." Central Florida
Investments, Inc. v. Parkwest Associates, 2002 UT 3, ^f 10, 40 P.3d 599.
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III.
DETERMINATIVE OR IMPORTANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
The following constitutional provisions, statutes and regulations are determinative
or important to the resolution of this appeal.
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-3 (repealed effective May 15, 2003).
A written agreement to submit any existing or future controversy to
arbitration is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, except upon grounds
existing at law or equity to set aside the agreement, or when fraud is alleged
as provided in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

2.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-3la-4(l) (repealed effective May 15, 2003).
(1) The court, upon motion of any party showing the existence of an
arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate. If an issue is
raised concerning the existence of an arbitration agreement or the scope of
the matters covered by the agreement, the court shall determine those issues
and order or deny arbitration accordingly.

3.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-6.5. Definition of heir.

As used in Sections 78-11-7, 78-11-8, and 78-11-12, "heirs" means:
(1) the following surviving persons:
(a) the decedent's spouse;
(b) the decedent's children as provided in Section 75-2-114;
(c) the decedent's natural parents, or if the decedent was adopted, then his
adoptive parents;
(d) the decedent's stepchildren who:
(i) are in their minority at the time of decedent's death; and
(ii) are primarily financially dependent on the decedent.
2

(2) "Heirs" means any blood relative as provided by the law of intestate succession
if the decedent is not survived by a person under Subsections (l)(a), (b), or (c).
4.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-7. Death of adult-Suit by heir or personal
representative.
Except as provided in Title 34A, Chapter 2, Workers' Compensation Act, when
the death of a person not a minor is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of
another, his heirs, or his personal representatives for the benefit of his heirs, may
maintain an action for damages against the person causing the death, or, if such
person is employed by another person who is responsible for his conduct, then also
against such other person. If such adult person has a guardian at the time of his
death, only one action can be maintained for the injury to or death of such person,
and such action may be brought by either the personal representatives of such adult
deceased person, for the benefit of his heirs, or by such guardian for the benefit of
the heirs as provided in Section 78-11-6. In every action under this and Section
78-11-6 such damages may be given as under all the circumstances of the case may
be just.
5.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12. Survival of action for injury to person or death
upon death of wrongdoer or injured person—Exception and restriction to out-of-pocket
expenses.
(l)(a) Causes of action arising out of personal injury to the person or death caused
by the wrongful act or negligence of another do not abate upon the death of the
wrongdoer or the injured person. The injured person or the personal
representatives or heirs of the person who died have a cause of action against the
wrongdoer or the personal representatives of the wrongdoer for special and general
damages, subject to Subsection (l)(b).
(b) If prior to judgment or settlement the injured person dies as a result of a cause
other than the injury received as a result of the wrongful act or negligence of the
wrongdoer, the personal representatives or heirs of that person have a cause of
action against the wrongdoer or personal representatives of the wrongdoer only for
special damages occurring prior to death that result from the injury caused by the
wrongdoer, including income loss. "Special damages" does not include pain and
suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, and other not readily quantifiable damages
frequently referred to as general damages.
(2) Under Subsection (1) neither the injured person nor the personal
representatives or heirs of the person who died may recover judgment except upon
competent satisfactory evidence other than the testimony of that injured person.
3

6.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3 (Supp. 2002). Definitions.

(10) "Health care" means any act or treatment performed or
furnished, or which should have been performed or furnished, by any
health care provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the
patient's medical care, treatment, or confinement.

(14) "Malpractice action against a health care provider" means any
action against a health care provider, whether in contract, tort, breach
of warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise, based upon alleged
personal injuries relating to or arising out of health care rendered or
which should have been rendered by the health care provider.

(20) "Patient" means a person who is under the care of a health care
provider, under a contract, express or implied.
7.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17(b) (Supp. 2002):

the [arbitration] agreement shall require that
(i) one arbitrator be collectively selected by all
persons claiming damages;
(ii) one arbitrator be selected by the health care
provider;
(iii) a third arbitrator be jointly selected by all
persons claiming damages and the health care
provider from a list of individuals approved as
arbitrators by the state or federal courts of
Utah. .. .
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IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendants/Appellants Richard M. Rosenthal, M.D., Gregory P. Stevens,
M.D. and IHC Health Center - Holladay (hereinafter "Health Care Providers") moved to
compel arbitration of Plaintiff/Appellee's (hereinafter "Baker") claims based on the
existence of a written arbitration agreement and the provisions of the Utah Arbitration
Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-3la-4 (repealed effective May 15, 2003), mandating that "[t]he
court, upon motion of any party showing the existence of an arbitration agreement, shall
order the parties to arbitrate." R. 9-31; 85-87. This appeal was brought to challenge the
district court's ruling denying arbitration.
Following briefing by the parties and oral argument, the trial court on May 14,
2003, entered its ruling denying Health Care Providers' motions. R. 85. In denying their
motions, the trial court concluded that "plaintiffs wrongful death action is separate and
distinct from the cause of action the deceased would have had for personal injuries had he
survived. Therefore, plaintiffs cause of action for wrongful death is wholly separate and
distinct from any action her husband might have maintained. Furthermore, she did not
sign the Arbitration Agreement." R. 85-86. Health Care Providers now appeal the trial
court's legal conclusion and request that the arbitration agreement be enforced.
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V.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts are relevant to the issues presented to this Court for review.
1.

On April 3, 2001, Gary Baker, who received health care from these Health

Care Providers, executed a written arbitration agreement. R. 35; see Addendum at p. 32.
2.

The arbitration agreement expressly specifies that the parties agree to

binding arbitration:
Article 1: Agreement to Arbitrate: We hereby agree to
submit to binding arbitration all disputes and claims for
damages of any kind for injuries and losses arising from the
medical care rendered or which should have been rendered
after the date of this Agreement. All claims for monetary
damages against the physician, and the physician's partners,
associates, association, corporation or partnership, and the
employees, agents and estates of any of them (herein
collectively referred to as "physician"), must be arbitrated
including without limitation, claims for personal injury, loss
of consortium, wrongful death, emotional distress or punitive
damages. ..
Arbitration Agreement, R. 35; Addendum at p. 32.
3.

The Arbitration Agreement expressly makes the spouse and heirs of Mr.

Baker third-party beneficiaries:
We expressly intend that this Agreement shall bind all persons
whose claims for injuries and losses arise out of medical care
rendered or which should have been rendered by Physician
after the date of this Agreement, including any spouse or heirs
of the patient and any children, whether born or unborn at the
time of the occurrence giving rise to any claim (hereinafter
collectively referred to as "Patient ")
Arbitration Agreement, R. 35; Addendum at p. 32.
6

4.

The Arbitration Agreement specifies that the parties waive the right to trial:
Article 2: Waiver of Right of Trial: We expressly waive all
rights to pursue any legal action to seek damages or an)' other
remedies in a court of law, including the right to a jury or
court trial, except to enforce our decision to arbitrate, to
collect any arbitration award and to facilitate the arbitration
process as permitted by the Utah Arbitration Act.

Arbitration Agreement, R. 35; Addendum at p. 32.
5.

The Arbitration Agreement expressly provides for other parties to

participate in the arbitration:
The parties consent to the participation in this arbitration of
any person or entity that would otherwise be a proper
additional party in a court action and which agrees to be
bound by the arbitration decision. Any existing court action
against such additional person or entity shall be stayed upon
agreement to participate in the arbitration.
Arbitration Agreement, R. 35; Addendum at p. 32.
6.

On October 7, 2002, Baker filed a complaint as personal representative of

the Estate of Gary Baker, for herself and the other heirs of Gary Baker, alleging medical
malpractice against Health Care Providers relating to the death of Gary Baker on April
11
OAA1
1 i , ^uvy i .

7.

D
£
i v . \j.

On December 16, 2002, Richard M. Rosenthal, M.D., moved to compel

arbitration. R. 9.
8.

On December 18, 2002, Gregory P. Stevens, M.D. and IHC Health Center -

Holladay moved to compel arbitration. R. 22.
9.

Baker opposed the motions to compel arbitration, filing a memorandum in
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opposition on January 15, 2003. R. 40-52.
10.

On February 3, 2003, Richard M. Rosenthal, M.D., filed a reply

memorandum in support of his motion to stay and compel arbitration. R. 54.
11.

On February 3, 2003, Gregory P. Stevens, M.D. and IHC Health Center -

filed a reply memorandum in support of their motion to compel arbitration. R. 64.
12.

On April 9, 2003, the Honorable Claudia Laycock heard oral argument.

13.

On May 13, 2003, the Honorable Claudia Laycock entered an order

R. 85.

denying Health Care Providers motions based on the court's conclusion that
plaintiffs wrongful death action is separate and distinct from
the cause of action the deceased would have had for personal
injuries had he survived. Therefore, plaintiffs cause of
action for wrongful death is wholly separate and distinct from
any action her husband might have maintained. Furthermore,
she did not sign the Arbitration Agreement."
R. 85-86; Addendum at pp. 29-30.

VI.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This medical malpractice action arises out of the care provided to Gary Baker by
Health Care Providers prior to his death on April 11, 2001. Utah Code Ann. § 78-31 a-4
(repealed effective May 15, 2003), mandates that "[t]he court, upon motion of any party
showing the existence of an arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate."
(Emphasis added.) It is uncontrovered that a written arbitration agreement to submit any
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existing or future controversy to arbitration was executed by Gary Baker on April ?, 2001.
The plain language of the arbitration agreement specifies that "All claims for monetary
damages . . . must be arbitrated including without limitation, claims for personal injury,
loss of consortium, wrongful death, emotional distress or punitive damages." R. 35.
(Emphasis added.) The agreement further specifies that "this Agreement shall bind all
persons whose claims for injuries and losses arise out of medical care rendered or which
should have been rendered by Physician after the date of this Agreement, including any
spouse or heirs of the patient and any children." R. 35. The agreement also specifies that
the parties, "expressly waive all rights to pursue any legal action to seek damages or any
other remedies in a court of law, including the right to a jury or court trial." Under
principles of contract construction, Baker is bound to arbitrate all claims arising from the
underlying health care provided to Gary Baker. Although Baker did not actually sign the
agreement, she is bound as a third party beneficiary to the arbitration agreement, as a
spouse of the signatory decedent, and in her official capacity as the personal
representative of Gary Baker's estate. In addition, the arbitration agreement's waiver of a
right to trial is a valid defense applicable to both the claims of Gary Baker and the
wrongful death claim of Mrs. Baker and the other heirs. Finally, policy favors
enforcement of arbitration agreements.
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VII.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
SECTION 78-31A-4(l) SPECIFIES THAT "THE COURT, UPON MOTION OF
ANY PARTY SHOWING THE EXISTENCE OF AN ARBITRATION
AGREEMENT, SHALL ORDER THE PARTIES TO ARBITRATE."
The issues before this Court should be resolved in favor of Health Care Providers
through the proper statutory interpretation of the applicable statutes. As the Utah
Supreme Court has held:
When faced with a question of statutory construction, we look
first to the plain language of the statute. In so doing, [w]e
presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and
give effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted
meaning. We will not infer substantive terms into the text
that are not already there. Rather, the interpretation must be
based on the language used, and [we have] no power to
rewrite the statute to conform to an intention not expressed.
Arredondo v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 2001 UT 29, \ 12, 24 P.3d 928
(quotation marks and citations omitted, alterations in original). Thus, each word is to be
given effect.
Arbitration agreements are valid and enforceable under Utah law. In The Utah
Arbitration Act, the legislature clearly provided, "A written agreement to submit any
existing or future controversy to arbitration is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, except
upon grounds existing at law or equity to set aside the agreement, or when fraud is alleged
as provided in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-3 (repealed
effective May 15, 2003). The Act specifies that "[t]he court, upon motion of any party
10

showing the existence of an arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3la-4 (repealed effective May 15, 2003) (emphasis added). The
legislature crafted the Act with the clear intent that agreements to arbitrate should be
given effect.
In matters of statutory construction, "[t]he best evidence of
the true intent and purpose of the Legislature in enacting [an]
Act is the plain language of the Act."
Plaits v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah 1997) (citing State v. Hunt,
906 P.2d311, 312 (Utah 1995);.
By the plain language of the Act, it is clear that given the existence of an
agreement to arbitrate and upon motion by a party, arbitration is mandatory. The use of
the language "shall" demonstrates the intent that arbitration be mandatory.
It is also well established that "[t]he form of the verb used in a
statute, i.e., something 'may,' 'shall5 or 'must5 be done, is the
single most important textual consideration determining
whether a statute is mandatory or directory."
"According to its ordinary construction, the term 'may' means
permissive, and it should receive that interpretation unless
such a construction would be obviously repugnant to the
intention of the Legislature or would lead to some other
inconvenience or absurdity." The term "shall," on the other
hand, "is usually presumed mandatory and has been
interpreted as such previously in this and other jurisdictions."
State ex rel M.C., 940 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citations omitted).
"The meaning of the word shall is ordinarily that of command." Herr v. Salt Lake
County, 525 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 1974). Consequently, the legislature advisedly used
mandatory language when it provided, "The court, upon motion of any party showing the
11

existence of an arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate." Utah Code
Ann. § 78-3 la-4 (repealed effective May 15, 2003). Thus, arbitration is mandatory.
"This mandatory language leaves no discretion to the court." Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT
19,176,5P.3d616.
POINT II.
THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT UNAMBIGUOUSLY SPECIFIES THAT
CLAIMS FOR WRONGFUL DEATH BE ARBITRATED AND THAT ANY
SPOUSE, HEIR OR CHILD IS BENEFITTED AND BOUND BY THE
ARBITRATION AGREEMENT.
The scope of the arbitration agreement is unambiguous. The arbitration agreement
expressly specifies that binding arbitration is the intent and bargain of the parties. The
agreement clearly applies to all claims, including those for wrongful death:
We hereby agree to submit to binding arbitration all disputes
and claims for damages of any kind for injuries and losses
arising from the medical care rendered or which should have
been rendered after the date of this Agreement. All claims
for monetary damages against the physician, and the
physician's partners, associates, association, corporation or
partnership, and the employees, agents and estates of any of
them (herein collectively referred to as "physician"), must be
arbitrated including without limitation, claims for personal
injury, loss of consortium, wrongful death, emotional
distress or punitive damages. . .
Arbitration Agreement, R. 35; Addendum at p. 32 (emphasis added).
It is unambiguous that Mr. Baker's spouse and heirs were intended to be within the
scope of the agreement and that any claim arising out of the medical care at issue is
subject to arbitration. The arbitration agreement expressly makes the spouse and heirs of
Mr. Baker third-party beneficiaries:
12

We expressly intend that this Agreement shall bind all
persons whose claims for injuries and losses arise out of
medical care rendered or which should have been
rendered by Physician after the date of this Agreement,
including any spouse or heirs of the patient and any
children, whether born or unborn at the time of the occurrence
giving rise to any claim.
Arbitration Agreement, R. 35; Addendum at p. 32 (emphasis added).
The Arbitration Agreement specifies that the parties waive the right to trial:
We expressly waive all rights to pursue any legal action to
seek damages or any other remedies in a court of law,
including the right to a jury or court trial, except to enforce
our decision to arbitrate, to collect any arbitration award and
to facilitate the arbitration process as permitted by the Utah
Arbitration Act.
Arbitration Agreement, R. 35; Addendum at p. 32. In addition, the Arbitration
Agreement expressly provides for other parties, including Dr. Stevens, and IHC Health
Center - Holladay, to participate in the arbitration:
The parties consent to the participation in this arbitration of
any person or entity that would otherwise be a proper
additional party in a court action and which agrees to be
bound by the arbitration decision. Any existing court action
against such additional person or entity shall be stayed upon
agreement to participate in the arbitration.
Arbitration Agreement, R. 35; Addendum at p. 32
In opposing Health Care Providers5 motions to compel arbitration, Baker relied
largely on the Colorado Court of Appeals case, Pacheco v. Allen, 55 P.3d 141 (Colo.
App. 2001). However, recently in Allen v. Pacheco, 71 P.3d 375 (Colo. 2003), the
Colorado Supreme Court overruled the lower court's ruling stating: "[W]e reject the
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court of appeals' analysis and agree with the trial court that the arbitration
agreement applies to both (1) wrongful death actions and (2) non-party spouses." Id.
at 381 (emphasis added). Although the arbitration agreement was unenforceable on other
grounds, the Colorado Supreme Court carefully set forth its analysis concerning the
enforceability of the arbitration agreement against a non-signatory spouse's wrongful
death claim.
In Allen, as in the case at hand, the surviving spouse opposed submitting her
claims to arbitration under an agreement signed by her deceased husband. The reasoning
and analysis employed by the Colorado Supreme Court is informative and persuasive.
Applying well-established principles of contract interpretation, the Colorado Supreme
Court examined the arbitration agreement and determined that the language plainly
applied to "any claim of medical malpractice . . . including, but not limited to, death." Id.
at 378-79. The court reasoned, "We must construe the terms of the agreement in a
manner that allows each party to receive the benefit of the bargain, and the scope of the
agreement must faithfully reflect the reasonable expectations of the parties. In other
words, we must interpret the agreement in a manner that best effectuates the intent of the
parties." Id. at 378.
The court then looked to the specific language of the arbitration agreement, noting
"as we examine whether [the parties], via the contract between them, intended the scope
of the arbitration agreement to include both (1) wrongful death claims and (2) non-party
spouses, we must look to the plain and ordinary meaning of the agreement itself and

14

construe any ambiguities in favor of arbitration.'' Id at 378-79 (emphasis addedV
The Allen court continued its reasoning:
Although it is true that a wrongful death claim is separate and
distinct from a cause of action the deceased could have
maintained had he survived, this observation is not helpful in
determining whether separate wrongful death claims are in
fact included within the plain and ordinary meaning of the
agreement. Because the plain language of the agreement in
this case refers to "all claims" including those brought for
"death," and because we must apply a strong presumption in
favor of arbitration, we find that the arbitration agreement
applies to wrongful death claims.
Id. at 379.
In addressing the fact that the surviving spouse had not signed the agreement, the
Colorado Supreme Court corrected the erroneous statement of the Colorado Court of
Appeals:
The court of appeals reasoned that the arbitration clause does
not apply to a non-party such as Pacheco because a non-party
to a contractual agreement cannot be bound by its terms.
Pacheco, 55 P.3d at 143. This statement of the law is
inaccurate. Although it is true that in general, only the parties
to a contract are bound by its terms, a non-party may fall
within the scope of the agreement if the parties so intend.
Id. at 379-80 (citations omitted). The court then held:
Because the contract reflects the intent of the parties to bind
claimants other than signatory members, the fact that Pacheco
is a non-party does not by itself exempt her from the
arbitration agreement. So long as she is within the category
of heirs, personal representatives, or persons claiming special
duties, she is bound by the arbitration agreement.
Id. at 380 (emphasis added).

15

As was the case in Allen, the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used in
the arbitration agreement demonstrates that the parties' intent was to subject all claims to
arbitration, including claims for wrongful death, and to bind the spouse and heirs to the
agreement.
Utah law further supports enforcing the agreement against Baker as a third party
beneficiary. Because Mr. Baker's spouse and heirs are third-party beneficiaries to the
agreement, it is enforceable both by and against them. "The predominant inquiry in any
third party beneficiary case is whether the contracting parties clearly intended the third
party to receive a separate and distinct benefit from the contract." Oxendine v. Overturf
1999 UT 4, \ 14, 973 P.2d 417. "The intent of the contracting parties to confer a separate
and distinct benefit must be clear." American Towers Owners Ass 'n, Inc. v. CCI
Mechanical, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1188 (Utah 1996).
The Utah Supreme Court has stated, "Whether a third-party beneficiary status
exists is determined by examining a written contract. The issue can be decided on
summary judgment as a question of law." American Towers Owners Ass 'n v. CCI
Mechanical, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1188 (Utah 1996). "If the language within the four
corners of the contract is unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the
plain meaning of the contractual language, and the contract may be interpreted as a matter
of law." Wagner v. Clifton, 2002 UT 109, f 12, 62 P.3d 440. As set forth previously, it is
undisputed that the spouse and heirs of Mr. Baker are within the scope of the arbitration
agreement. Moreover, it is undisputed that the scope of the arbitration includes claims
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from wrongful death. The health care was rendered on the condition that "All claims
based on the same occurrence, incident, or care shall be arbitrated in one proceeding."
R. 35. Under these circumstances, it is fully consistent with fairness and contract law that
the third-party beneficiaries to the agreement be subject to its provisions, including the
arbitration provision. Therefore, Baker, as a third-party beneficiary, is entitled to the
benefit of the agreement as a third-party beneficiary, and the agreement is both
enforceable by Baker and against her.
Other courts have enforced arbitration agreements against nonsignatories to the
agreements for other reasons and circumstances. For example:
In some cases, a nonsignatory was required to arbitrate a
claim because a benefit was conferred on the nonsignatory as
a result of the contract, making the nonsignatory a third party
beneficiary of the arbitration agreement. In other cases, the
nonsignatory was bound to arbitrate the dispute because a
preexisting relationship existed between the nonsignatory and
one of the parties to the arbitration agreement, making it
equitable to compel the nonsignatory to also be bound to
arbitrate his or her claim. . . .
Appellate courts have stated that arbitration agreements are
enforced with regularity against nonsignatories. (See, e.g.,
Mormile v. Sinclair, supra, 21 Cal. App.4th at p. 1511, 26
Cal.Rptr.2d 725.) However, a preexisting relationship
between the nonsignatory and one of the parties to the
arbitration agreement is a common factor in these cases. For
example, when a patient who agreed to arbitration brings a
medical malpractice action against a physician, some courts
hold that the patient's spouse must arbitrate a loss of
consortium cause of action even though the spouse did not
sign the arbitration agreement. (Id. at pp. 1511-1516,26 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 725; Gross v. Recabaren (1988) 206 Cal. App.3d
771, 781, 253 Cal. Rptr. 820.)...
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A spouse must arbitrate a wrongful death claim when his or
her decedent spouse applied for health insurance for both of
them and the application contained an arbitration clause.
{Hawkins v. Superior Court (1979) 89 Cal. App.3d 413,
416-419, 152 Cal. Rptr. 491.) The wrongful death claims of
nonsignatory adult heirs of a group health plan member must
be arbitrated if the member agreed to arbitrate his or her heirs'
claims. {Herbert v. Superior Court (1985) 169 Cal. App.3d
718, 722-727, 215 Cal. Rptr. 477.)
County of Contra Costa v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. 47 Cal. App.4th 237,
242-43, 54 Cal. Rptr.2d 628, 631 (1996).
Because Baker is attempting to assert claims based on "claims for injuries and
losses aris[ing] out of medical care rendered or which should have been rendered," Baker
must accept the burdens along with the benefits, and should be compelled to arbitrate her
claims. It would be manifestly unjust to require otherwise.
POINT III.
DEFENSES AVAILABLE AGAINST THE DECEASED, INCLUDING WAIVER
OF THE RIGHT TO TRIAL, MAY BE ASSERTED AGAINST BAKER.
The trial court refused to enforce the Arbitration Agreement against Baker,
asserting that "plaintiffs wrongful death action is separate and distinct from the cause of
action the deceased would have had for personal injuries had he survived," that
"plaintiffs cause of action for wrongful death is wholly separate and distinct from any
action her husband might have maintained," and that, in any event, plaintiff "did not sign
the Arbitration Agreement." R. 85-86. However, the trial court's ruling is contrary to
Utah law. Under well-established Utah law, a wrongful death action is not entirely
separate and distinct from the cause of action the deceased would have had for the
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personal injuries had he survived. The wrongful death cause of action relates to the
underlying wrong done to the decedent, and is subject to defenses that could have been
asserted against the decedent.
Although Utah courts recognize that "an action for wrongful death is an
independent action accruing in the heirs of the deceased," Utah courts have "not entirely
separated the heirs' right from the decedent's because the heirs' right is in major
part based on the rights of support, both financial and emotional, that run to them
from the deceased." Jensen v. IHCHospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 332 (Utah 1997)
(emphasis added). Thus, it is well-established that:
the wrongful death cause of action is based on the underlying
wrong done to the decedent and may only proceed subject to
at least some of the defenses that would have been available
against the decedent had she lived to maintain her own action.
Id. "As the Van Wagoner Court said, the heirs have 'a right to proceed against the
wrongdoer subject to the defenses available against the deceased, had he [or she] lived
and prosecuted the suit.'" Kelson v. Salt Lake County, 784 P.2d 1152, 1155 (Utah 1989)
{citing Van Wagoner v. Union Pacific R.R., 186 P.2d 293, 303-04 (Utah 1947)) (emphasis
added).
Interpreting a claim for wrongful death under Utah law, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals has also noted:
[E]ven though it is a separate and distinct action which arises
on the death of the decedent, the foundation of the right of
action is the original wrongful injury to the decedent. And it
is essential to the maintenance of the action that the wrongful
act or default be of such character that the decedent could
19

have maintained an action to recover damages for his injury if
death had not ensued. While it is not a derivative action in the
ordinary meaning of the term, recovery cannot be had unless
the decedent could have recovered damages for his wrongful
injury had he survived.
Francis v. Souther Pac. Co., 162 F.2d 813 (10th Cir. 1947), affd 333 U.S. 445 (1948).
Thus, defenses which could have been asserted against the decedent remain viable
against claims for wrongful death. In this case, Gary Baker's waiver of the right of trial
remains a viable defense. The arbitration agreement includes a specific, unambiguous
waiver to the right to trial.
Waiver of Right of Trial: We expressly waive all rights to
pursue any legal action to seek damages or any other remedies
in a court of law, including the right to a jury or court trial,
except to enforce our decision to arbitrate, to collect any
arbitration award and to facilitate the arbitration process as
permitted by the Utah Arbitration Act.
R. 35. Such waiver of the right to trial is a valid defense which remains applicable to
Baker's wrongful death claim.
Moreover, any claim asserted by Baker which is not part of the wrongful death
claim would be subject to the arbitration agreement because the personal representative of
a decedent's estate is bound by contracts signed by the decedent.1 See, e.g., In re Estate
ofShepley, 645 P.2d 605 (Utah 1982). Thus, claims of the estate are subject to the

Elements considered in wrongful death include: u[F]inancial support furnished;
loss of affection, counsel and advice; the loss of deceased's care and solicitude for the
welfare of the family; and loss of the comfort and pleasure the family of the deceased
would have received." Oxendine v. Overturf, 1999 UT 4, ^ 19, 973 P.2d 417. Other
claims asserted in this action would be claims of the estate.
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arbitration agreement. The arbitration agreement specifically identifies claims made by
Mr. Baker's "spouse or heirs of the patient" as governed by the agreement.
Consequently, this Court should enforce the Arbitration Agreement against the estate and
all the heirs, which would encompass both those claims based on the survival statute and
those based on the wrongful death statute.
POINT IV.
THE UTAH HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT PROVIDES FOR
ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AGAINST PERSONS
OTHER THAN THE PATIENT.
The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act also specifically encompasses "any action
against a health care provider, whether in contract, tort, breach of warranty, wrongful
death, or otherwise, based upon alleged personal injuries relating to or arising out of
health care rendered or which should have been rendered by the health care provider."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(15) (emphasis added.) Thus, the Health Care Malpractice
Act's provisions concerning the enforcement of arbitration agreements against persons
other than the patient are applicable to wrongful death claims. Section 78-14-17(b) of the
act provides that:
the [arbitration] agreement shall require that
(i) one arbitrator be collectively selected by all
persons claiming damages;
(ii) one arbitrator be selected by the health care
provider;
(iii) a third arbitrator be jointly selected by all
persons claiming damages and the health care
21

pro\ ider from a list of individuals approved as
arbitrators by the state or federal courts of
Utah
The legislature expressly anticipated that arbitration agreements would encompass claims
other than those brought by the patient such as wrongful death and loss of consortium.
POINT V.
THE POLICY OF UTAH LAW FAVORS ARBITRATION,
In addition to the express language of the agreement entitling Health Care
Providers to a stay in the proceedings in order to participate in arbitration, there exists a
presumption in favor of arbitration. Moreover, arbitration agreements should be
construed in favor of covering asserted disputes. The Utah Supreme Court has stated:
Arbitration is a contractual remedy for the settlement of
disputes by extrajudicial means. It is a remedy freely
bargained for by the parties, and "provides a means of giving
effect to the intentions of the parties, easing court congestion,
and providing a method for expeditions and less expensive for
the resolution of disputes." There is a strong public policy in
favor of such a remedy, but it should not be involved to
resolve disputes that the parties have not agreed to arbitrate.
Arbitration clauses should be liberally interpreted when the
issue contested is the scope of the clause. If the scope of an
arbitration clause is debatable or reasonably in doubt, the
clause should be construed in favor of arbitration unless it can
be said that it is not susceptible to an interpretation that covers
the asserted dispute. If an arbitrable issue exists, the parties
should not be deprived of the benefits of the agreement for
which they bargained.
Lindon Cityv Engineers Constr. Co., 636 P.2d 1070, 1073 (Utah 1981) (quotingKing
County v. Boeing Co.. 570 P.2d 713, 717-18 (Wash. Ct. App. (1977)).
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The Lindon Court went on to state: "As to whether the content of a contract is
arbitrable, doubts should be resolved in favor of the parties' freedom to contract." Id. at
1072-73 (citing Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S. 574 (I960)). It then
concluded:
There appears to be no "public policy" or other good reason
why persons effectively and by contract, should not be able to
agree to out-of-court settlement. It is accomplished frequently
by stipulation, binding concessions, accord and satisfaction,
covenant not to sue, by indemnity contract, and by other
honorable and legal means.
The trends toward such inter se agreements without resorts to
litigation, reflects a good, practical way to resolve disputes.
Id. at 1073.
It is well established that arbitration is a contractual agreement to settle disputes by
extrajudicial means. In fact, the Court characterized arbitration as a manner where
"persons effectively and by contract. . . agree to out-of-court settlement." Id.
Consequently, an arbitration award should be properly treated as another form of
voluntary out-of-court settlement. The parties have agreed to settle their dispute through
extrajudicial means.
In Allred v. Educators Mut. Ins. Ass 'n of Utah, 909 P2d 1263 (1996), the Utah
Supreme Court unanimously upheld the enforceability of the arbitration clause in the
insurance policy and stated:
The Act supports arbitration of both present and future
disputes and reflects long-standing public policy favoring
speedy and inexpensive methods of adjudicating disputes.
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Id. at 1265 (citation omitted).
"Where the evidence relating to a purported agreement to arbitrate is undisputed,
the district court has no discretion under the statute. It must compel arbitration." McCoy
v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah, 2001 UT 31, t 10, 20 P-3d 901 (citing Docutel
Olivetti v. Dick Brady Sys. Inc., 731 P.2d 475, 479-80 (Utah 1986)). The arbitration
agreement should be enforced and all parties ordered to participate in arbitration of
Baker's claims.
As a binding contract, the arbitration agreement "is of course subject to attack only
on the same basis as any other written agreement or contract, by showing that because of
fraud, duress, undue influence, mistake, incapacity or other infirmity that in equity and
good conscience it should not be enforced." Pagano v. Walker, 539 P.2d 452, 454 (Utah
1975). Indeed, "people are generally free to bind themselves pursuant to any contract,
barring such things as illegality of subject matter or legal incapacity." Phone Directories
Co. v. Henderson, 2000 UT 64, U 15, 8 P-3d 256. In this case, no ground exists to set
aside the agreement. Even if a party may subsequently regret having entered into the
agreement to arbitrate his or her claims, it is long-standing law that:
Parties should be permitted to enter into contracts that actually
may be unreasonable or which may lead to hardship on one
side. Although courts will not be parties to enforcing
flagrantly unjust agreements, it is not for the courts to assume
the paternalistic role of declaring that one who has freely
bound himself need not perform because the bargain is not
favorable.
Bekins Bar VRanch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 459 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted).
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In addition, it is also the policy of the state of Utah to favor and encourage
enforcement of arbitration agreements. Indeed, u[T]he policy of our law favors
arbitration as a speedy and inexpensive method of adjudicating disputes." DeVore v. IHC
Hosp. Inc., 884 P.2d 1246, 1251 (Utah 1994). Even the U.S. Supreme Court has
recognized that the policy of the United States is to favor and encourage arbitration. See
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercwy Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S. Ct.
927, 947, 74 L. Ed. 2d 765 (1983) ("Section 2 [of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.
§ 2] is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.")
VIII.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Appellants Gregory P. Stevens, M.D. and IHC
Health Center - Holladay respectfully request that the Court reverse the ruling of the trial
court and order that arbitration agreement be enforced in this matter.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2£%xy

of February 2004.

BURBIDGE & WHITE

Larry R. fahite

J"~^RU~M»*^—
Paul D. Van Komen
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellants Gregory P.
Stevens, M.D. and IHC Health Center - Holladay
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ADDENDUM

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3la-3 (repealed effective May 15, 2003)
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Utah Code Ann. § 778-3la-4 (repealed effective May 15, 2003)
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ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
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78-3 la-3. Arbitration agreement.
A written agreement to submit any existing or future controversy to
arbitration is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, except upon grounds existing
at law or equity to set aside the agreement, or when fraud is alleged as
provided in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

78-3la-4. Court order to arbitrate.
(1) The court, upon motion of any party showing the existence of an
arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate. If an issue is raised
concerning the existence of an arbitration agreement or the scope of the
matters covered b\T the agreement, the court shall determine those issues and
order or deny arbitration according!}7.
'2) If an issue subject to arbitration under the alleged arbitration agreement
is involved in an action or proceeding pending before a court having jurisdiction to hear motions to compel arbitration, the motion shall be made to that
court. Otherwise, the motion shall be made to a court with proper venue.
(3) An order to submit an agreement to arbitration sta}^s any action or
proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitration under the agreement.
However, if the issue is severable from the other issues in the action or
proceeding, only the issue subject to arbitration is stayed. If a motion is made
in an action or proceeding, the order for arbitration shall include a stay of the
action or proceeding.
(4) Refusal to issue an order to arbitrate may not be grounded on a claim
that an issue subject to arbitration lacks merit, or t h a t fault or grounds for the
claim have not been shown.

Larry R. White (#3446)
Paul'D. Van Komen (#7332)
BURBIDGE & WHITE
Attorneys for Defendants, Gregory P. Stevens, M.D.
and IHC Health Center - Holladay
50 South Main Street, #1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801) 359-7000

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CHPJSTTNE BAKEP., For Herself and on
Behalf of the Heirs of GARY BAKER,

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
COMPEL ARBITRATION

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 020404386

GREGORY P. STEVENS, M.D., RICHARD
M. ROSENTHAL, M.D., and IHC HEALTH
CENTER - HOLLADAY,

Judge Claudia Laycock

Defendants.

The defendants' Motions to Compel Arbitration came before the Court for hearing
pursuant to notice on Wednesday, April 9, 2003, at 2:00 p.m., the Honorable Claudia Laycock
presiding. The plaintiff was represented by Craig M. Snyder. The defendant, Richard M.
Rosenthal, M.D., was represented by Brian P. Miller. The defendants, Gregory P. Stevens, M.D.,
and IHC Health Center-Holladay, were represented by Larry R. White. The Court having
reviewed the briefs of the plaintiff and the defendants and having heard oral argument and being
fully advised in the premises finds that plaintiffs wrongful death action is separate and distinct

from the cause of action the deceased would have had for personal injuries had he survived.
Therefore, plaintiffs' cause of action for wrongful death is wholly separate and distinct from any
action her husband might have maintained. Furthermore, she did not sign the Arbitration
Agreement. The Court being fiilly advised in the premises and good cause therefore appearing;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the defendants'
Motions to Compel Arbitration should be and the same are hereby denied.

DATED this _ [ § day of May, 2003.
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I hereby certify that on the
day of May, 2003,1 caused to be served by the method
indicated below a true and correct copy of the attached and foregoing ORDER DENYING
MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION to the following:
VIA FACSIMILE
VIA HAND DELIVERY
VIA U.S. MAIL
VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS

Craig M. Snyder
HOWARD LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 300 North
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, UT 84603

VIA FACSIMILE
VIA HAND DELIVERY
VIA U.S. MAIL
VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS

Brian P. Miller
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
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Article 1: Agreement tn Arbitrate: We hereby agree ID submit ID binding arbitration al! disputes and claims for damages of
any kind for injuries and losses arising from the medical care rendered or which should have been rendered after the aatr of this
Agreement. AlJ claims for monetary damages agains: the physician, and the physician's partners, associates, association, corporation
or partnership, and the employees, agents and estates of any of them (hereinafter collectively referred ID as "Physician"), rnusr be
arbitrated including, without limitation, claims for personal injury, loss of consortium, wrongful death, emotional distress or punitive
damages. We agree thai the Physician may pursue a iegaJ action to collect any fee from the patienr and doing so shall not waive the
Physician's right 10 compel arbitration nf any malpractice claim. However, following the assertion of any malpractice claim auainst
.the Physician, any fee dispute, whether or nor the subject of any existing legal action, shall also be resolved by arbitration.
We expressly intend thar this Agreement shall bind all persons whose claims for injuries and losses arise ou: of medical znrs
rendered or which should have been rendered by Physician after the date of this Agreement, including any spouse or heirs of the
patient and any children, whether bom or unborn at the rime of the occurrence giving rise to any claim (hereinafter collectively
referred to as "Patient").
Article 2: Waiver of Righr of Trial; We expressly waive all rights to pursue any legal action to seek damages or any other
remedies in a coun of law, including the right to a jury or court trial, except to enforce our decision to arbitrate, to collect any
arbitration award and to facilitate the arbitration process as permitted by the Utah Arbitration Act.
Article 3: Procedures and Appointment of Arbitrators: Patient shall serve Physician by certified mail with a written
demand far arbitration which shall specify the nature Df the claim, the date of the claimed occurrence, the complained of conduct by
the Physician, and a description of the Patients1 injuries and damages. Within 60 days after the demand, the parties shall agree upon a
neutral arbitrator to be selected "from a list of individuals approved as arbitrators by the State or Federal courts of Utah. If the panics
cannot agree upon a neutral arbitrator, the court shall select an individual from that list. The neutral arbitrator shall: preside over the
arbitration hearing and pre-arbitration conferences; establish scheduling orders; supervise iht conduct of discovery to prevent abuse
and insure efficiency and cost-effectiveness; rule on all motions, including motions for summary judgment and motions to dismiss for
failure to proceed with reasonable diligence; administer oaths; issue subpoenas; and exercise other powers granted to arbitrators In the
Utah Arbitration Act. Within six months of the demand for arbitration or as otherwise ordered by the neutral arbitrator, Patient shall
select one arbitrator and Physician shall select one arbitrator. Patient and Physician shall pay the fees and expenses, of his or her own
arbitrator. Each parry snail share equally the expenses and fees of the neutral arbitrator. The panics agree that the arbitrators have the
immunity of a judicial officer from civil liability when acting in the capacity of an arbitrator under this Agreement.
All claims based on the same occurrence, incident or care shall be arbitrated in one proceeding: however, Patient or
Physician shall have chs absolute right to arbitrate separately issues of liability and damage upon written request to the neutral
arbitrator. Arbitration hearings will be held in the County of the Physician's principal place of business or elsewhere as the parties
may agree.
The parties consent ID the participation in this arbitration of any person or entity that would otherwise be a proper additional
parry in a coun action and which agrees to be bound by the arbitration decision. Any existing coun action against such additional
person or entity shall be stayed upon agreemeni to panicipate in the arbitration.
The parries agree thai the arbitration proceedings are private, not public, and the privacy of the panics and of the arbitration
proceedings shall be preserved.
Article 4: Applicable Law: With respect to any matter not herein expressly provided for, the arbitration shall be governed
by the Utah Arbitration Act All provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, with the exception of the notice of intent and
pre-iitigarion hearing requirements which the panics hereby waive, shall apply to the arbitration. The comparative fault provisions of
Utah law apply to the arbitration and the arbitrators shall apportion fault to all persons or entities who contributed to the. claimed injury
whether or not they are panics to the arbitration.
Article 5: Revocation: This Agreement may be revoked by wrinen notice mailed to the Physician, by cenified mail, within
30 days after signature, and if not revoked shall govern all medical services received by the Patient after the date of this Agreement.
Article 6: Term; the term of this Agreement is one year from the date it is signed. It shall be automatically renewed from
year to year thereafter uniess cither party to this Agreement notifies the other of his or her election not to renew in writing delivered by
certified mall prior to Lhe rcnrwal date.
Article 7: Read and Understood; I (Patient or Patient's representative) have read and I understand the above Agreement. I
understand that 1 have the right to have my questions about arbitration answered and J do noi have any unanswered questions. I
execure this agreement of my own free will and not under any duress, and I understand thai I my signing this agreement is not a
requirement in order io receive medical services from Physician.
Article 8: Revived Copy; I have received a copy of this document.
Article 9: Severability: If any provision of this Agreement is held invalid or unenforceable, the remaining provisions shall
remain in full force and shall not be affected by the invalidity of any other provision.

Richard Roseetkll, Inc.
dba.Otfffin B?A)n <£ Spine Center
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